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The Mirage of the State 
Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic 
 
by Maxime H. A. Larivé 
 
The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be 
misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The 
latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical 
Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once 
again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to 
disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged 
wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have 
been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 
Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). 
France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union 
military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the 
collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members 
of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater 
instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after 
the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-
religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for 
radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to 
protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups 
directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the 
Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid 
the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are 
uncontrolled and illegal.3  
Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing 
neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of 
the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George 
                                                     
 Maxime H. A. Larivé, Ph.D. is a Research Associate at the EU Center of Excellence at the University of Miami. 
His first book, Debating European Security and Defense Policy, is scheduled for publication in Fall 2014 with 
Ashgate.  He writes on European politics and security for Politipond at https://politipond.wordpress.com/ 
1 The author recognizes that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was part of a broader neoconservative agenda seeking 
to develop a model of liberal democracy throughout the Middle East. Nevertheless, the crisis in Iraq remains connected 
to the argument of this article. 
2 For instance, after the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, Afghanistan became a training 
ground for terrorist networks until the Western intervention in 2001.  
3 On August 1st, the French military intervention in Mali, Operation Serval, will end leading to the beginning of 
a broader regional French-led military mission, Operation Barkhane, throughout the Sahel region. The French will on 
August 1st, 2014 launch a region-wide counterterrorist military mission with five African countries – Chad, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania –. Such mission brings the fight against terrorism to another level, regional. 
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W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of 
continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. 
If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling 
and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African 
Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la 
Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the 
reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? 
This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect 
on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, 
the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional 
crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and 
applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are 
examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum. 
The Mirage of the State 
 
Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) are in the continuity of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. 
The members of the Euro-Atlantic community – Western European powerhouses and the United 
States (US) – have been committing the same error every time they have launched a military 
intervention since the end of the Cold War. Their decision is directly embedded into one wrong 
assumption: the state as the primary holder of power. The policy-makers and leaders of the Euro-
Atlantic community assume that each military intervention is taking place in state similar to a 
western model. This mirage of the state has led Western powers into unwinnable battles. 
Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Mali and CAR were and are all failed-states. Some were 
holding under the authority of an authoritarian regime like in Iraq, Libya and Syria organized 
around a father figure. Nevertheless, their networks of institutions are either ineffective or 
inefficient, their governments do not have legitimate control of power, corruption is rampant, and 
flagless tribes are ruling part of the land. In each case, states are unable to control their borders, do 
not have legitimacy, and are not the primary holder of power. The porousness of the borders in 
Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq,5 Mali and CAR is a real challenge when fighting non-state actors and/or 
rebuilding a state.  
For instance, the movements of people and goods between Pakistan and Afghanistan have 
made the fight in Afghanistan unwinnable at least in the short-term. Experts understand that 
without the stabilization of Pakistan the reconstruction of Afghanistan will not be possible.6 In 
Libya, heavily armed non-state actors have simply flown through the Libyan borders into the desert 
of the Sahel during the NATO mission in the spring of 2011. Now in Mali with the fast and so far 
successful French military offensive, radical Islamic fighters are retrieving into the desert in 
Northern Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. However, this quick advance of the French army is not 
                                                     
4 The author recognizes some serious limitation in the argument considering the lack of data. However, the 
principal purpose of the article consists in asking a N-question rather than a n-question. 
5 The current rise of the ISIS in Iraq is a clear demonstration of the porousness of Iraqi and Syrian borders.  
6 Riecke, H., Francke, K. (eds). 2013. Partners for Stability: Involving Neighbors in Afghanistan’s 
Reconstruction: Transatlantic Approaches. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
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synonymous of victory.7 Experts have argued that Islamic fighters have in fact learned the lessons 
of Afghanistan in 2001. Instead of fighting a superior military power, retrieving is a far better 
strategy at first in order to protect human and military capital, and then launch an insurgency-type 
offensive against the occupying force. This scenario is very much in the minds of French military 
leadership as it could lead to the bog down of the French army in Mali. In August, the French 
mission in Mali, Operation Serval, will end and give the buck to another French-led mission, 
Operation Barkhane, in charge of fighting terrorism throughout the Sahel region. The risks of an 
endless war are high, the same way they have been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Counter-
insurgency wars and counterterrorist mission are difficult to win and may lead to lengthy and costly 
military occupations. Iraq and Afghanistan are the prime examples.8 Western forces have already 
been involved in Afghanistan for over a decade. As demonstrated by Stiglitz,9 the costs of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are above three trillion dollars affecting the stability of the American 
economy especially during crisis times. France does not have the military and intelligence 
capabilities required for a lengthy counter-insurgency war and it does not possess the domestic 
economic engine needed to sponsor a decade-long war.10 Table 1 exposes the situation in six 
countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Mali and CAR – and looks at the different types of 
Western interventions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 See Heisbourg, F. 2013. A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali. Survival 55(2): 7-18; Merchet, J-D. 
2013. Au Mali la Blitzkrieg de l’Armée Française, Marianne. 28 January; The Economist. 2014. The war is far from 
over; Mali and the Sahel. 31 May: 39-40; The Economist. 2014. François Hollande’s African adventures. July 19th. 
8 Rosenau, W. 2009. Counterinsurgency: lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Harvard International Review 31(1): 
52 
9 Stiglitz, J. 2008. The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company. 
10 Larivé, M. 2013. France in War: Operation Serval. Foreign Policy Association’s Blogs. January 16. Available 
on http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/01/16/france-in-war-operation-serval/ [Accessed on July 20th 2014]. 
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Table 1: Euro-Atlantic interventions in the post-9/11 world order 
Countries11 Afghanistan Iraq Syria Libya Mali CAR 
Year of invasion 2001 2003 None 19 March 
2011 
11 January 
2013 
2013 
Western forces US, most 
European 
nations and 
NATO 
US and 
Coalition of 
the Willing 
US and 
France 
France-led, 
US, Britain 
France France 
Transatlantic 
solidarity 
Yes, used of 
Article 5 of 
Transatlantic 
Charter 
No, only 
coalition of 
the willing 
No for 
strategic and 
domestic 
reasons 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Causes for 
intervention 
 
Terrorism + 
failed state led 
by the Taliban 
 
Manufactured 
causes 
(Weapons of 
Mass 
destruction) 
 
Chemical 
warfare 
against 
civilian 
 
Arab Spring + 
violence 
orchestrated 
by the 
Qaddafi 
regime 
against 
opposition 
Stopping the 
rise of AQIM 
+ rise of 
Islamic 
radicalization 
+ spread of 
violence with 
the fall of the 
Qaddafi 
regime 
Political 
tensions 
+ risk of 
spillover 
to the 
region + 
ethno-
religious 
warfare  
Type of 
intervention 
Military Military None Military Military Military 
End of 
intervention 
Scheduled for 
2014  
Ended in 2011 None 31 October 
2011  
August 1st, 
2014 
Ongoing 
Length of 
intervention 
Ongoing 9 years No 
intervention 
7 months 1 year and 
half 
Ongoing  
 
CSDP 
Missions12 
Civilian CSDP 
mission: 
EUPOL-A, 
training ANP 
Civilian 
CSDP 
mission: 
EUJUST 
LEX-Iraq 
 
None 
Civilian 
CSDP 
mission: 
EUBAM in 
Libya 
EUTM in 
Mali 
Military 
CSDP 
mission 
EUFOR 
Bangui 
Status of the 
State 
Failed state run 
by Talibans 
Authoritarian 
regime led by 
Saddam 
Hussein 
Authoritarian 
regime led by 
Al-Assad 
Authoritarian 
regime led by 
Qaddafi 
Failed state Failed 
state 
                                                     
11 For further information on the six countries selected, refer to the work produced by the Council on Foreign 
Relations: on Afghanistan, refer to the work produced by the Council on Foreign relations at 
http://www.cfr.org/region/afghanistan/ri218 [Accessed on 8 July 2014]; on Iraq, refer to the work produced by the 
Council on Foreign relations at http://www.cfr.org/region/iraq/ri358 [Accessed on 8 July 2014]; on Syria, refer to the 
work produced by the Council on Foreign relations at http://www.cfr.org/region/syria/ri370 [Accessed on 8 July 
2014]; on Libya, refer to the work produced by the Council on Foreign relations at 
http://www.cfr.org/region/libya/ri363 [Accessed on 8 July 2014]; on Mali, refer to the work produced by the Council 
on Foreign relations at http://www.cfr.org/region/mali/ri196 [Accessed on 8 July 2014]; on CAR 
http://www.cfr.org/region/central-african-republic/ri176 [Accessed on 8 July 2014] 
12 For further information on the CSDP missions deployed in the following countries refer to the EEAS’ website: 
on EUPOL-A at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/index_en.htm [Accessed on 8 
July 2014]; on EUBAM Libya at [Accessed on 8 July 2014]; on EUJUST LEX-Iraq at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/index_en.htm [Accessed on 8 July 2014];   on 
EUBAM in Libya athttp://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm [Accessed on 8 
July 2014];  on EUTM in Mali at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/index_en.htm 
[Accessed on 8 July 2014]; EUFOR Bangui at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-
rca/index_en.htm [Accessed on 8 July 2014]. 
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Success of the 
mission 
No, weak 
Afghan state + 
difficult 
elections + 
instabilities 
No, rise of the 
ISIS taking 
over Iraq + 
regime under 
Maliki 
Ongoing 
violence from 
the Al-Assad 
regime 
against Syrian 
oppositions 
Ongoing 
violence and 
instabilities 
Unclear – 
launch of 
Operation 
Barkhane 
throughout 
the Sahel 
Unclear 
due to 
ongoing 
military 
operation 
The Buzanian Trinity 
 
Reflecting over the Western interventions in the post-9/11 era and the Western attempts in state-
building, one shall closely analyzed the concept of the state. Such concept entails a very large body 
of literature.13 One of the most important contributions to the study of such question is the 
Weberian approach to the state, which can be defined as an entity capable of monopolizing 
violence and exercising control over the entirety of its national territory.14 The Weberian approach 
consists in looking at the basic foundation of the state. In the terms of Bourdieu, “the state is the 
culmination of a process of concentration of different kinds of capital: […] coercive capital (army, 
police), economic capital, cultural or informational capital, and symbolic capital. This 
concentration, as such, gives the state a sort of meta-capital, which gives it power over the other 
kinds of capital and their holders.”15 Based on sociological approach of Bourdieu, the state is a 
materialization of an ensemble of capitals making it a superior entity above the other power 
holders.  
In the continuity of these explanations conceptualizing the state, Barry Buzan, one of the 
leading scholars in the field of international security, wrote “sovereignty provides the crucial 
element dividing states from all other social units. It is the glue that binds the territorial-polity-
society package together.”16 Unfortunately such trinity does not exist either in Mali, Libya, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia or even CAR. Western military planning and strategies usually take this 
trinity for granted prior military interventions, which has led them numerous military failures. In 
the case of the members of the Euro-Atlantic community, how long did it take in Europe and the 
US to develop their own territorial-polity-society package? And was it forced by any external 
powers? Certainly the world in the 18th century was not as globalized and intertwined as today, 
nevertheless it took them centuries in order to materialize itself into their current nature and shape. 
Certainly these questions should not be asked by military strategists, but should be in the 
mind of foreign policy makers when thinking about going to war and ending it. The concept of 
state and sovereignty may be the most mentioned and cherished concepts by most heads of state 
or governments and diplomats,17 but it actually means something different every time due to 
divergences of political system, culture, and history.  
                                                     
13 Tilly, C. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992. New York: Wiley-Blackwell; Scott, J. 
C. 1999. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Failed. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 
14 Weber, M. 1946. Politics as a Vocation, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
15 Bourdieu, P. (ed). 1994. Raison pratiques: Sur la théorie de l’action. Paris: Le Seuil, 109 
16 Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 67. 
17 Such statement is based on my observations during my work as political expert at the EU Delegation to the 
United Nations and supervising the UN Security Council. 
8 
 
France is committing the exact mistakes made by the US in 2001 and 2003 and the one 
made by the West in 2011 as it has underestimated the context and structure of problem: the state. 
The Malian state cannot be compared to developed states such as France, Britain or even the United 
States. For instance, in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan there is no national identity, cohesive 
population, and solid institutions. Since the fall of Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has been in free fall, 
becoming a new bastion of radical Islamic groups and transnational criminal groups. In 
Afghanistan, despite having a President, powerful tribes like the Pashtun are controlling large 
geographical areas as well as claiming the allegiance of Afghans by providing them with 
traditionally state sanctioned public goods such as security and assistance. For instance, Maj. Jim 
Gant of the Army’s Special Forces describes the landscape of Afghanistan demonstrating the 
challenges that Western powers are facing when doing nation-building, 
 
“[Afghanistan is] constituted of tribes. Not individuals, not Western-style citizens—but 
tribes and tribesmen.… Tribes understand protection. Tribes are organized and run to 
ensure the security of the tribe. Not only physical security, but revenue and land protection. 
But most important of all is preservation of the tribal name and reputation.... When honor 
is at stake, tribal members stop at nothing to preserve their tribe’s integrity and “face.” 
[T]ribes understand power. How many guns do we have? How many warriors can I put in 
the field? Can I protect my tribe? Can I attack others who threaten my tribe? Can I back 
my words or decisions up with the ability to come down the valley and kill you? Can I keep 
you from killing me? Lastly, tribes understand projection. Tribes have no ‘strategic goals’ 
in the Western sense. Their diplomatic, informational, military and economic priorities are 
almost without exception in reference to other tribes.”18 
 
In Mali, France is now dealing with secular tuareg filling the power vacuum taking place in the 
country since the departure of the Islamists pushed away by the French army.19 The power vacuum 
occurring in Mali has occurred equally in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. It can only be filled with 
several aspects: domestically, with the development of a stronger polity and a national identity; 
regionally, with the control of borders by neighboring countries; and internationally, with the 
support of international institutions and foreign aid by outside powers.  
A Shift in American and European Doctrines? 
 
So far France is repeating exactly the same mistakes made by the US in 2003 in Iraq. After the 
take over of Timbuktu on January 29, 2013, French President, François Hollande, declared “we 
[France and Mali] are in the process of winning the battle” followed by the declaration of the 
Defense minister of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, “the mission is fulfilled.” This early 
triumphalism looks too much like the 2003 Mission Accomplished speech by former US President 
George W. Bush on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln soon after the fall of the Saddam 
                                                     
18 In Khalili, L. 2010. The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency. Middle East Report (255) 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/khalili.html  
19 Lecocq, B., Klute, G. 2013. Tuareg separatism in Mali. International Journal 68(3) 
 
 
9 
 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. These American and French triumphalism only serve three purposes: 
please the public opinion at home; boost the short-term poll ratings of the president; and remind 
the world of their status of imperial powers. Any experts would argue that the war in Mali is far 
from being won. In recent months, the French government has been working on the creation and 
establishment of a 3,000-strong counterterrorism force in the Sahel region under the name of 
Operation Barkhane starting in August 2014. Such operation, with its headquarter in N’Djamena, 
Chad, and its forces present in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, demonstrates the long-
term involvement of France in the Sahel region.20  
In Mali, despite strong support to the French mission, President Obama has been extremely 
reticent in intervening alongside the French army for several reasons. Aside from Mali not being 
a direct matter of national interest, the Obama administration understands these challenges and 
difficulties to solve these security problems without creating a regional power vacuum. For these 
reasons, the US has been reticent to intervene in Mali and arm the Syrian oppositions to the Al-
Assad regime. Furthermore the death of US ambassador in Libya Christopher Stevens caused 
severe criticism against the Obama administration and its intervention in Libya. The Obama 
doctrine does not include ground military offensive in order to protect a territory or polity. The US 
is now committed to short-term military actions in localized area with a very precise strategic goal. 
It appears that under the Obama administration, the US has understood its limited success and the 
difficulty to succeed in state-building type of mission and the financial and human commitments 
to such endgame have become too great. The failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have indeed 
demonstrated the difficulty of the task of state-building. 
When it comes to the role of the European Union (EU) as global security actor, direct 
military intervention has never been part of the role of the EU and the Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is not a European army, and usually intervene later on in the 
process. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya nor Mali the EU has sent some military and police trainers.21 
In the case of Mali, its latest Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission, EUTM Mali, 
was not at first the appropriate one, but may be more valuable with the launch of French-led 
operation Barkhane. The EU mission in Mali demonstrates the desire of European capitals to 
continue the European defense experiment.  
As it was the case in Afghanistan with the EUPOL-A – a civilian mission in charge of 
training the Afghan National Policy (ANP) –, and now Mali with the EUTM Mali – a training 
mission of the Malian security forces –, how can the EU push for the reform and construction of 
the security forces – police and army – when there are not standing and legitimate institutions? In 
the case of CAR, the EU was behind schedule on the deployment of a military mission, EUFOR 
CAR in Bangui.22 The EUFOR mandate is limited with a goal to protect local population in the 
                                                     
20 The Economist. 2014. François Hollande’s African adventures. July 19th; AllAfrica. 2014. Operation Barkhane 
Increases French Influence in the Sahel. July 22nd; 
21 One should underscore that the EU did deploy with serious delay a military CSDP operation in CAR. 
Nevertheless, it is a small military force confined to the protection of Bangui and the airport. 
22 The deployment of EUFOR CAR in Bangui was delayed due to difficulty to materialize the commitment of the 
28 Member States in terms of equipment and human contributions. EUFOR CAR has a 6-months mandate composed 
of police and military forces. For more information, see: Larivé, M. The EU at War: CAR Mission Highlights Internal 
Tensions. The National Interest. February 5. Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-eu-war-car-
mission-highlights-internal-tensions-9819 [Accessed on July 22, 2014] 
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capital, Bangui, in the middle of an ethno-religious warfare. EUFOR complements the French and 
African Union troops already on the ground in avoiding an eventual genocide.23  
In Afghanistan, the challenges are too great and the EUPOL-A cannot succeed in its 
original mission embedded in the concept of security sector reform.24 Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in the 2013 ECFR report, the EU’s least successful policy in 2012 was the Security 
Sector Reform.25 The EUPOL-A has the complex mission, with limited human, financial, security 
capabilities and low political commitment by European capital, to build the next Afghan National 
Police (ANP). Not only the EU faces a strategic challenge with the US as both actors have different 
visions for the role and future of ANP; Europe foreseeing a civilian police force, whereas the US 
sees it as a counter-insurgency police force. But the development of a police force is difficultly 
feasible without legitimate institutions, a national identity, and a national narrative. This is the 
challenge of Afghanistan, and will be the same in Mali. Interestingly, in European capitals, there 
is a sense that civilian missions are less risky and more achievable than military ones. It may be 
true in the short-term, but in the long-run civilian missions have proven costly and of limited 
success as it has been the case in Afghanistan. 
How to Solve the Mirage of the State? 
 
Chuck Hagel, the US Secretary of Defense, claimed in August 2011 when discussing the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: “We’ve got to get out of those wars. Let the people [local populations] 
decide what they want. If they don’t want what we wanted for them, or if they certainly don’t want 
what we wanted for them as much as we want it, then we can’t control that.”26 This point is central 
for the West as the endgame is ultimately the construction of a viable Afghan state and for the ones 
in Iraq, Libya and Mali. But here are the real questions: Is it the desire of local populations? Do 
Afghans want a state modeled onto a Westphalian format? Can democracy and secularism be 
implemented, adapted to local cultures, and more importantly accepted? The lack of national 
identity in Afghanistan and other countries as well as the limited allegiance to a centralize source 
of power are the challenges to success rate of Euro-Atlantic missions.  
What are the solutions? First, if Euro-Atlantic citizens are keen in going to war they must 
as well accept the length of military interventions. As demonstrated by the lengthy occupations of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, failure to stabilize Libya, and now the Malian operation, American and 
European citizens may be in favor for short-term wars, but not favorable for lengthy state-building 
operations. The Western attempts to develop states à la Westphalian all around North Africa, the 
Middle East and Central Asia have proven to be too lengthy and costly. Western public opinions 
need to accept the cost-benefit of such operations. 
                                                     
23 The French troops are of 2000 soldiers as part of the military Operation Sangaris, while the African Union 
counts 6000 troops. 
24 For more information on the concept of the SSR and its implementation by the EU, see: Dursun-Ozkanca, O. 
(ed.) 2014. The European Union as an Actor in Security Sector Reform. Current Practices and Challenges of 
Implementation. London & New York: Routledge. 
25 Vaïsse, J. and Dennison S. 2013. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013. European Council on Foreign 
Relations. January 
26 Financial Times. 2011. FT Interview with Chuck Hagel. August 29. 
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Second, international platforms like the United Nations will need to be used more as a place 
of discussion and interaction between Western powers and other countries rather than just being a 
source of legitimacy for Western interventions. Not only the culture of legitimacy needs to be 
changed, but the United Nations ought to be strengthened. One way to strengthen international 
organizations is through empowering them by increasing their funding, protecting their legitimacy, 
and assisting UN efforts on the ground. How can the UN be a respected international organization 
when domestically a large segment of American politicians is discrediting it? The UN is one of 
the few institutions that can be involved in actual nation-building and institution-building if 
properly funded and supported by Western and non-Western powers. 
Third, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community must change their understanding of 
world politics and adjust their visions of the world before going to war; otherwise it could be a 
very long 21st century. Twentieth century imperialism is not a sustainable model. Can the West 
continue to wage war across the globe against non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda and other radical 
Islamic groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda threatening to bomb Western homelands? The most recent 
French initiative, Operation Barkhane in charge of fighting terrorism in the Sahel region from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Horn of Africa, can become a quicksand for the French. For some reason, 
Western powers seem persuaded that they can go after terrorist networks in vast region. 
The European definitions of sovereignty and state, which are at the base of international 
law, need to be rethought. Many states around the world are unable to enforce security in all 
legitimacy without hurting their populations. The cases of Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali may 
diverge in the original purpose of the military mission,27 but they should be compared and studied 
altogether. Crises in these countries are directly linked to the previous European colonial heritage. 
The experiment of the construction of states à la Westphalian in the European sense of the term 
seems to have failed as demonstrated since the end of the Cold War. The trinity of territorial-
polity-society cannot be enforced by outside powers. “Rebuilding (or more often, simply building) 
a Western-style state – the only kind we can reasonably claim to know how to create – is a 
formidable and perhaps insurmountable challenge.”28 This is the lesson of the 20th century; now 
the 21st century should be about learning the lesson. 
                                                     
27 Refer to Table 1 
28 Rosenau, W. 2009. Counterinsurgency: lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Harvard International 
Review 31(1): 52 
